[ox] Konferenz-Beitrag: Demystifying intellectual property issues
- From: Stefan Merten <smerten oekonux.de>
- Date: Tue, 03 Jul 2001 23:51:58 +0200
Demystifying intellectual property issues
=========================================
Holger Blasum [holger blasum.net]
(including a minimal and a moderate alternative to the current IP regime)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
The creation of IP rights in modern history can be portrayed as a very
nice illustration of the influence of various pressure groups grazing
the commons. This view invalidates the natural right theory of
intellectual property (IP) and leaves contract theory - however
economists often found specific IP rights difficult to justify. A
minimal alternative (trademarks only) and a moderate alternative
(trademarks, industry-specific patents and short copyright) are
discussed. Concluding are some speculations on the comparative neglect
IP has received politically.
Introduction
============
Efforts should be made, making full use of information technology, to
ensure that all creators and users, in all parts of the world, are
knowledgeable about their rights, through ongoing efforts to enhance
public awareness of intellectual property rights and to demystify
intellectual property issues.
World Intellectual Property Declaration [7, Section 6, iv]
In the last twelve months, the growth of a global intellectual
property regime has been sharply criticized in petitions and politics
orgininating in Europe (patentability of software), Africa (global
validity of AIDS patents) and the US (scholars are petitioning to open
copyright for scholarly journals). In the entertainment sector,
Napster and its followers (e.g. Gnutella) technically challenge the
copyright doctrine. In the area of domain names, ICANN conceived the
need for a global democratic legitimation. The extreme lightness of
questions arising from pirating the Rolling Stones thanks to Napster
cannot well compare to the unbearable pain of the AIDS victims. But it
is often the property of revolutions to unite in a view radically
different horizons.[5]
Recurrent patterns in the emergence of IP rights (an attempt to apply 'proofs by induction' to history)
=======================================================================================================
In 1961 Machlup argued that the debate on patents was nothing than a
repetition of older arguments (Indeed one would not be able to quote a
20th century author if one wanted always only quote the first and true
inventor of an argument on the value of the patent system[19]). I
think that with the advent of modern reproduction technology the bias
has shifted considerably against strong IP protection but I agree that
at least most philosophical arguments in favor of IP have not changed,
so I would like to use history to deconstruct the natural rights
notion of IP (so that only contract theory is left). Many accounts of
IP history treat patents, copyright and trademarks separately (or
exclusively). Because our aim is simply to deconstruct the natural law
theory as a mixture of 'tragedy of the commons' plus domino effect,
the liberty is taken to mix everything up - after all it is not
accidental that the first fixed durations in copyright and patents
began both with 14 years.
Please grant me some privileges
-------------------------------
Unlike many other topoi of the political discourse (such as e.g.
freedom, taxes), intellectual property apparently had no role in the
antique cosmos and emerged in early modern times.
In medieval Europe, the idea of asking a political power to grant
exclusive rights for developing a business has evolved apparently
independently in various times and places. In the literature on the
history of patents one normally begins with the general history of
guilds (such as Renouard [28]) or with what now would be called
utility models in Venice (14th century) granted by glass-makers
guilds. Patents evolve e.g. in 16th century England and in the 16th
century German states. At that time, of course, grants of privileges
were obtained individually from the local sovereigns: So we ask
Sigmund von Maltitz carefully to give us upon our letter the ducal
mercy that during his lifetime nobody in our country can make a
waterworks of said art,[13, p. 90] an entrepreneur writes in a 1512
letter. Hoffmann [13] also shows that already the early patent
applicants were aware of the modern justification for granting
patents: reward for labor as natural right, contract theory as well as
disclosure and motivation effects.
Originally the term patent, coined in 16th century England, in
addition to inventions, was also used for all other kind of
crown-granted monopolies, or simple exploitation of businesses (such
as e.g. lighthouses) or printing of books (the regulation of the book
market being politically important):
The event in the history of Anglo-American copyright that led to the
shaping events of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was the
Charter of the Stationers' Company granted in 1556 by Philip and Mary,
the Roman Catholic successors to Henry VIII's Protestant son, Edward
VI. The Charter gave the stationers the power to make ordinances,
provisions, and statutes for the governance of the art or mistery of
stationery, as well as the power to search out illegal presses and
books and things with the power of seizing, taking, or burning the
foresaid books or things, or any of them printed or to be printed
contrary to the form of any statute, act, or proclamation.[23]
The term copyright refers to the rule that in order to print (copy) a
book, a publisher had to register his publication with the Stationers
Company.
The Lets-clean-up-that-mess pattern
-----------------------------------
After this first phase, the IP generation lifecycle sometimes halted
(as with the decline of Venetian power or in the German thirty years
war), but where political development avoided disastrous downturns the
growing jungle of patents evoked some counterreactions, such as when
patents on gambling cards were banned in a court decision (case of
monopolies 1603). In England a clean-up on trade patents (Statute of
Monopolies 1623) finally decided to grant trade patents only to the
first and true inventor of a new invention - Machlup [19] considers
this document the Magna Charta of inventors. However, in addition to
the reaffirmed inventors' IP also the printers' IP remained untouched
because it was so useful to the both government and the publishers'
guild:
William Crosskey points out that Philip and Mary incorporated the
Stationers' Company to set up a mode of regulating the English
printing trade that would facilitate the efforts of the Romish clergy
to stamp out the Protestant Reformation. But the motives of the
stationers were of a less exalted kind. Thus, Elizabeth, relying on
the stationers' self-interest, confirmed the Charter to turn the
stationers to support the English, rather than the Romish, church, and
the Stationers' Company became, in turn, the instrument of the Stuarts
against the Puritans, in the early seventeenth century; the instrument
of the Puritans, against their royalist enemies, when the Puritans
came to power; the instrument of the royalists against the Puritans,
after the Restoration; and, for a brief time, the instrument of the
triumphant Whigs, after the glorious Revolution, of 1688. But through
all these vicissitudes, the stationers themselves steadfastly
remained, what they had always been, eminently practical men; and they
consistently protected their monopoly.[23]
Of course, the stationers chose a more noble wording to defend their
monopoly Books (except the sacred Bible) are not of such general use
and necessity, as some staple commodities are, which feed and clothe
us, nor are they so perishable, or require change in keeping, some of
them being once bought, remain to children's children, and many of
them are rarities only and only useful to only very few, and of no
necessity to any, few man bestow more in Books than what they can
spare out of their superfluities ... And therefore property in Books
maintained among stationers cannot have the same effect, in order to
the public, as it has in other Commodities of more public use and
necessity.[26]. Naturally they also mentioned that market regulation
would result in less confusion. The piracy metaphor (for copying
without permission) also can be traced back into the 18th century
[11].
A recent instance of the Lets-clean-up-that-mess pattern can be found
in the EU Green Paper [6, p. 19] asking for the ex post legalization
of European software patents after some 13,000 software-related
inventions had been granted and case law been spoken against the
wording of the European Patent Convention (Par 52).
The The-others-have-it pattern
------------------------------
United States: The patent system was exported to the colonial empire
and (e.g. some American British colonies such as Carolina) and thus
made its way into the US constitution to promote the progress of
science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries (U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8). This
formulation had not been included in the first draft and there is also
evidence that its inclusion may have been facilitated by
well-administered lobbying effort:
A quaint but perhaps important early instance involves the efforts of
John Fitch, one of the persons who claimed to have invented the
steamboat, to obtain patent protection for his invention. During the
week of August 20, 1787, Fitch invited at least three (and perhaps
many more) members of the Constitutional Convention to see a
demonstration (and perhaps to ride upon) his invention. What exactly
was discussed during this demonstration we will never know, but the
chances are good that he pressed on the delegates the need for firmer,
national patent laws. Fitch's timing was either shrewd or fortuitous.
On August 18, the first draft of what ultimately became the
intellectual-property clause had first been presented to the
delegates. By September 5, they had settled on the language that was
ultimately incorporated into the Constitution.[8].
France: When Bouflers presented a petition of inventors for patents to
the National Assembly in 1791 the US were already shining example:
They didn't have these vain scruples, these strong and wise Americans,
these friends worthy of all freedom, who, in their new constitution,
have adopted the legislation of the English industry[28].
Germany: Huge lobbying efforts were necessary to implement patents in
Germany in 1877. The generation of the patent law is an early example
how a pressure group is formed in relatively short time generating an
opinion change in ministries and public opinion and mould it fastly
into legislation[3]. Again in Germany, the comparison with Britain
that assert patents rights in 1872 played a role [3].
Vertical extension: The the-others-have-it pattern also has played a
role in the vertical extension of IP, e.g. in the extension of
copyright to musical recordings (US 1971), computer programs (US 1980)
and architecture (US 1990). It can also be observed in the discussion
on software patents in Europe: The US patent system dominates the
world, and if we had the same system here then Siemens would apply for
more patents, for our engineers concentrate rather on the home market.
Of course we could just apply for the patents in the US but this makes
it more difficult to motivate our people for patent development[24] or
Although when agreeing on standards in international standardization
authorities it is customary that involved patent holders must agree to
grant licenses to adequate non-discriminatory conditions. Nonetheless
a company that does not possess any relevant patents is
disadvantaged.[15].
Economists on patents
---------------------
Machlup [19] observed that after patents had withstood the hot debates
of the 1860s and 1870s in Britain and Germany economists mostly turned
to other topics. In the 20th century, Plant [26] and Arrow [2] were
outspoken critics of the patent system as such but even well-known
defenders such as Schmookler [31] or Nordhaus have been at best
lukewarm:
The existence of a patent system reduces the uncertainty that
inevitably surrounds inventive activity. Without a patent system there
is not only technological uncertainty, but also uncertainity about
whether the firm can appropriate and license the invention. A patent
system is alleged to reduce the second kind of uncertainity, and to
the extent that inventors are risk averse, this will increase the
level of inventive activity. There is however, an additional
uncertainity created by the patent system, namely, whether the firm
will be the first to arrive at the Patent Office with the invention.
It is not clear which of these influences is more important.[22, p.
89].}}
Empirical studies also tend to show that the influence of the patent
system on company inventiveness is weak: Taken together, the empirical
evidence suggests that firm responsiveness to even significant changes
in patent design is limited.[30], According to detailed data obtained
from a random sample of 100 firms from 12 manufacturing industries,
patent protection was judged to be essential for the development or
introduction of one-third or more of the inventions during 1981-83 in
only 2 industries pharmaceuticals and chemicals. On the other hand, in
7 industries (electrical equipment, office equipment, motor vehicles,
instruments, primary metals, rubber, and textiles), patent protection
was estimated to be essential for the development and introduction of
less than 10 percent of their inventions. Indeed, in office equipment,
motor vehicles, rubber, and textiles, the firms were unanimous in
reporting that patent protection was not essential for the development
or introduction of any of their inventions during this period.[20] or
outright harmful our preliminary evidence suggests that the pro-patent
shift in the 1980s has altered the patent strategies of semiconductor
firms, but in ways that go beyond the classic incentives provided of
the patent system. On the one hand, stronger patent rights may have
facilitated specialization in the industry and may well have supported
a market for know-how exchange involving entrant firms. On the other
hand, such positive effects are countered by a socially inefficient
process whereby firms amass vast patent portfolios simply as
bargaining chips.[12]
One should be aware that studies on the economics of IP tend to focus
on producers (which do have accounting departments), not consumers
(which usually do not have accounting departments). A notable
exception from this are studies on the economics of libraries that a
dependent on the monopoly of journal publishers [32].
(Just) yet another IP crisis?
=============================
In the introduction it was noted that IP is under critique from quite
different sides. One might argue that IP has already survived well the
attacks of 1623, 1710, the 1860/70s so nothing seems new here.
Marginal information distribution costs approaching zero
--------------------------------------------------------
Unlike the age of the printing press (where making copies was still an
expensive job) the (theoretical) costs of distributing information
approaches zero. Assume that you want to read 1,000 pages of text
daily (to allow for extensive browsing) the total data volume data
volume is 2 MB daily and 700 MB annually (the cost of which are well
below 50 Euro). Of course this does not apply to downloading films,
software distro full CD images but it shows that the needs which a few
years ago would have sounded utopian now can be satisfied very
cheaply. Moore's prediction also still holds so that even for most of
todays 'expensive' applications bandwidth will probably quite cheap.
For a publisher of information, expensive distribution arrangements
(such as keeping a stock of paper copies, opening distribution
channels etc.) can be saved which greatly reduces the cost of
publishing as well.
What is wrong is that we have invented the technology to eliminate
scarcity, but we are deliberately throwing it away to benefit those
who profit from scarcity. We now have the means to duplicate any kind
of information that can be compactly represented in digital media. We
can replicate it worldwide, to billions of people, for very low costs,
affordable by individuals. We are working hard on technologies that
will permit other sorts of resources to be duplicated this easily,
including arbitrary physical objects (nanotechnology). The progress of
science, technology, and free markets have produced an end to many
kinds of scarcity. A hundred years ago, more than 99% of Americans
were still using outhouses, and one out of every ten children died in
infancy. Now even the poorest Americans have cars, television,
telephones, heat, clean water, sanitary sewers - things that the
richest millionaires of 1900 could not buy. These technologies promise
an end to physical want in the near future.[9]
Notably, artificial scarcity goes against traditional justifications
of property:
The significance of private property was enunciated long ago with
great clarity by David Hume in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles
of Morals. Property, he argued, has no purpose where there is
abundance; it arises, and derives its significance, out of the
scarcity of the objects which become appropriated, in a world in which
people desire to benefit from their own work and sacrifice. When the
security of property is adequately assured, property owners generally
see to it, that scarce "means" are directed to those uses which,
within their knowledge and judgment, are most productive of what they
want. Such is the diffusion of private property and of the desire to
use it, that it is at any rate generally true that there is not a
sufficient concentration of ownership of the supplies of a particular
good, and of all the easily substitutable alternatives for it, to
enable the owner to control prices of the property they own.[26, p.
30].}}
Ubiquity of artificial scarcity
-------------------------------
What is different from the situation e.g. in the not-so-industrialized
19th century is that the situation of artificial scarcity is
penetrating far more deeper into everydays' lifes. In the 19th century
far less persons had the educational foundation nor the material
resources to do research. Far less persons had access to journal or
scientific information. Modern (copiable) media such as photography,
cinema or television were not existent. Copying machines did not
exist. Reproduction of a printed article required (considerable)
investment into a printing press (or a scribe / secretary). So
intellectual property protection was only directly infringing with the
liberties of a few thousand persons.
Today in Germany more than 20% of the population have internet access,
around 20% of the population got (some) university education and
virtually everybody can be reached via mass media).
Also in the 19th century the amount of infringeable intellectual
property generated was far lower (indicated by patent statistics such
as Schmookler [31] or publication indexes) and due to higher
transaction costs for internationalization (transportation) far more
localized.
The total amout of artificial scarcity is the product of infringeable
intellectual property and potential infringers has thus grown
quadratically. Arguably, a third orthogonal dimension can be added by
taking into account the vertical expansion of the IP system.
The minimal alternative
-----------------------
From a theoretical point of view, there are at least two imaginable
equilibrium states for IP. One is maximal protection (what is coming
rather close to what we do have) and the other would be a state
without any patents or copyrights at all. As the liberalisation of the
utility or telephony sector has shown even in such a scenario content
providers are not likely to loose their market position (but are of
course under higher competitive pressure). It is not clear whether a
total minimal competition scenario will be more useful to medium- or
large-sized businesses but it can be assumed that it could be useful
to end users and small enterprise (which is sometimes close to end
users).
On the other hand, trade secrets can hardly be banned (though one
could limit the time for non-disclosure agreements) nor would it be a
good idea to give up unique internet protocol addresses (or domain
names). From this I would that if even under the minimalist model
certain kinds of trade marks (such as domain names) are useful. At
least in a non-mathematical sense, the namespace of typable or
memorable IDs is obviously more limited (scarce) than the space of
writeable texts or the space of patentable ideas. So this real
scarcity also justifies its political importance (which explains why
bodies such as ICANN receive so much attention). A good thing of a
once-welldefined namespace (such as the current domain name space) is
that land reforms are still comparatively cheap (e.g. remap
company.com to company.com.tm). Remapping the trade mark system onto a
unique global name space would also make it non-ambiguous and be
better enforceable and bring it back to its origins - consumer
protection (Initially, for example, most courts (and the leading
commentator) insisted that, to be protected, a trademark had to
include the name of the manufacturer.).[8].
A moderate alternative
----------------------
This would mean the same on trademarks, plus:
Restriction of copyright to a very short term (one could think of one
year - this is also the difference Peter Deutsch and the Ralph Levien
[17] have used for their different ghostscript licenses - and five
years (librarians estimate that 50% of books go out of print within 5
years [21])) so that news and entertainment providers as well as
software developers are not touched.
It could also be demanded that copyright is not granted per default
but only after registering the document (and maybe deposition of its
electronic version) with a unique document object identifier
(librarians would be happy about this and surely put up a
web-interfaced registry).
Patents are far more difficult and proposing optimizations can easily
backfire [35, p. 109] quotes an SPI representative that the
institution has failed; the same arguably applies to the simplified
jurisdiction at the CAFC (Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit).
Probably it is best to treat different industries differently (make
e.g. patent duration variable on patent classification); this may mean
to continue non-patentability for software and finance or even extend
non-patentability to other areas. One could think about dropping the
examination (which consumes time and resources; furthermore granted
patents are more lucrative to the offices which of course also
corrupts the examination process [1].
Also one of the compromises that Lutterbeck [18, p. 132] proposes such
as to allow distribution but not commercial distribution of source
code (source code privilege) is problematic in that it hinders
commercial usage of open source and commercial usage of non-open
source software in general.
Personally, I could imagine the minimal alternative as a long-term
option and the moderate alternative as a more realistic political
agenda.
Political neglect
=================
Challenging the IP system in general does not help the specific agendas of involved interest groups
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
One cannot expect any particular professionals' group suffering from
IP expansion to become very vocal on IP in general for anybody doing
this risks being blamed for making illicit generalizations both from
within the group and out of it.
Let us illustrate this with software developers:
There is a striking lack of discussion from the usual leaders with
regards to the application of copyright in areas other than software.
Raymond is mute, and Stallman mumbles. They both seem to view software
as a special case: Raymond tacitly, and Stallman explicitly. [...] The
question of software as a special case remains unresolved (and
probably unresolvable) in my opinion. We are left to ponder for
ourselves whether we should apply our free software attitudes to other
works as well. [34]. The same of course more intensively applies to
software patents where the issues at stake are even higher: No
Politics - Do not include in your emails any political analysis.
Otherwise, certain civil servants at the European Commission will
pretend that you are politically biased and claim that your arguments
are irrelevant.[33] and even [29] is very careful about his thoughts
on the economy of the patents: Finally, I do not in any way represent
the whole movement of people against software patents. In this
movement are people who approve of patents in general except for
software, people who think that patents are useful in some specific
cases outside of the software industry but not in general, people
without opinion on patents in general but against software patents,
and people who oppose patents in general. As far as I know, most
people in the movement against software patents are in the third
category without an opinion in general, and most of the remaining are
in the first two categories. As far as I know, the reason is that they
don't have a clear understanding of how patents in general work or do
not work, so they tend to accept the legitimacy of existing laws a
priori, until proven incorrect. Such was also my opinion (or lack
thereof) about patents, until I undertook to untangle the economic
issues behind patents. I am now most definitely in the last category,
a posteriori, after a lot of hard thought, the conclusion of which I'm
presenting in current document. I do not claim to represent anyone but
myself, and I expect my arguments to be considered a posteriori, after
pondering them, for what they are, good or bad, and not a priori,
without pondering them, for the number or quality of people who back
them.
Political parties?
------------------
Most of the aforementioned economists writing or criticizing IP were
liberals (such as Plant or Machlup; for a detail of libertarian
perspectives see Kinsella [14, p. 8]) and it is interesting that also
on the political left there is little criticism on intellectual
property (a notable albeit isolated exception, Proudhon, [27], but
nothing can be found e.g. in the works of Marx. Ironically, socialist
parties rather seem have to become defenders of e.g. patents on behalf
of the inventors, e.g. The inventor, if he wishes to defend his
intellectual property against capitalist pirates, must begin by buying
that right, taking out a patent, which he must renew every year; on
the day he misses a payment, his intellectual property becomes the
lawful prey of the robbers of capitalism. Even if he pays, he can
secure that right only for a time: in France, fourteen years. And
during these few years, not long enough generally to get his invention
fully introduced into practical industry, it is he, the inventor, who
at his own expense has to set in motion the machinery of the law
against the capitalist pirates who rob him. [16] (Lafargue, son-in-law
to Marx, was in the French socialist party).
Also Lafargues next conclusion is diametrically opposed to the
author's conclusions: The trade-mark, which is a capitalistic property
that never required ally intellectual effort, is on the contrary
indefinitely protected by law like material property.[16].
Gispen [10] writing on the genesis of the employee inventors law
created in Nazi Germany gives a nice example how bipartisan these
overtones can be Especially on the forefront of the movement there
were many voices that not only the working masses but also the
knowledge workers are exposed to capitalist domination. For these
aspects the Fuhrer doubtless had great interest.
Still today even social democrat governments in Europe still push
IPization of academic research for better marketization (e.g. German's
minister of education Bulmahn To generate new patents and market-ready
products the results of public research must be better utilized. By a
new marketization iniative the process from idea generation to
patenting shall be recognized and strengthened. With over 100 million
DM networks of patent and utilization agencies are founded and patent
subsidies for creating enterprses are provided.[25]
Now that the problems with software IP have become visible, parties,
philosophers and politicians should back a broader dialogue. (The fact
that some IP laws are governed by international treaties such as TRIPS
is no counterargument; at least one can try to change the treaties.) I
would like to finish this section with a quote from an MPAA copyright
press release: For in the end, this is not only a fight about the
protection of music or movies, software code or video games. Nor is it
a fight about technology's promise or its limitations. This is, at its
core, quite simply about right and wrong. Thank you for letting me
speak from the heart.[4]
Academic research
-----------------
Some additional areas where research might be interesting:
interoperability vs patents, as demanded by Lutterbeck [18]
comparative research on innovation in different industries (for years
I have been arguing for studies (not opinions) to be done of the
quality of issued patents in a variety of fields (Aharonian [1]), a
study on the conspicuous absence of IP in philosophy and / or the
political left and of course game theory of the generation of IP
rights.
A. Bibliography
===============
1
Aharonian, Greg: [Patents] Economic assessment.
http://www.aful.org/pipermail/patents/2000-November/001096.html,
2000.
2
Arrow, Kenneth J.: Economic Welfare and the Allocation of
Resources for Inventions. The Rate and Direction of Inventive
Activity, Princeton Univ., 1962.
3
Boch, Rudolf: Das Patentgesetz von 1877 - Entstehung und
Wirtschaftliche Bedeutung. Rudolf Boch, Patentschutz und
Innovation in Geschichte und Gegenwart, Peter Lang, Frankfurt
a.M., 1997.
4
Bronfman, Edgar: Remarks As Prepared For Delivery by Edgar
Bronfman, Jr. Real Conference, San José, California,
http://www.mpaa.org/copyright/EBronfman.htm, 2000.
5
Cohen, Daniel: La propriété intellectuelle, c'est le vol. Le
Monde, 07 Apr 2001,
http://www.lemonde.fr/rech_art/0,5987,170287,00.html, 2001.
6
Commission, European: Green Paper on the Community patent and the
patent system in Europe.
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/intprop/indprop/558.htm,
1997.
7
Commission, WIPO Policy Advisory: World Intellectual Property
Declaration.
http://www.wipo.org/about-wipo/en/pac/ip_declaration.htm, 2000.
8
Fisher, William W.: The Growth of Intellectual Property: History
of the Ownership of Ideas in the United States.
http://eon.law.harvard.edu/property99/history.html, 1999.
9
Gilmore, John: What's wrong with content protection.
http://cryptome.org/jg-wwwcp.htm, 2001.
10
Gispen, Kees: Die Patentgesetzgebung in der Zeit des
Nationalsozialismus und in den Anfangsjahren der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland. Rudolf Boch, Patentschutz und Innovation in
Geschichte und Gegenwart, Peter Lang, Frankfurt a.M., 71-82,
1997.
11
Halbert, Deborah: Weaving Webs of Ownership.
http://www.soc.hawaii.edu/ future/dissertation/TOC.html, 1998.
12
Hall, Brownyn H., Rose Marie Ham: The Patent Paradox Revisited:
Determinants of Patenting in the US Semiconductor Industry,
1980-94. NBER Working Paper No. W7062,
http://papers.nber.org/papers/W7062/, 1999.
13
Hoffmann, Fritz: Beitraege zur Geschichte des Erfindungsschutzes
in Deutschland im sechzehnten Jahrhundert. Zeitschrift fuer
Industrierecht Vol. 10 No. 8 85-93, No. 9 97-105 No. 10 109-118,
1915.
14
Kinsella, N. Stephan: Against Intellectual Property. Journal of
Libertarian Studies, Vol 15, no 2 (Spring 2001): 1-53,
http://www.mises.org/journals/scholar/kinsella6.PDF, 2001.
15
Korber, Arno: Patentschutz aus der Sicht eines Großunternehmens.
Rudolf Boch, Patentschutz und Innovation in Geschichte und
Gegenwart, Peter Lang, Frankfurt a.M., 25-32, 1997.
16
Lafargue, Paul: Socialism and the intellectuals.
http://www.marxists.org/archive/lafargue/works/socint.htm, 1900.
17
Levien, Raph: An open letter to the Ghostscript development
community. http://www.artofcode.com/ghostscript/openletter.html,
2000.
18
Lutterbeck, Bernd: Sicherheit in der Informationstechnologie und
Patentschutz fuer Softwareprodukte - ein Widerspruch ?.
http://www.sicherheit-im-internet.de/download/Kurzgutachten-Software-patente.pdf,
2000.
19
Machlup, Fritz: Die wirtschaftlichen Grundlagen des Patentrechts.
GRUR, http://www.sffo.de/machlup1.htm, 1961.
20
Mansfield, Edwin: Imitation costs and patents: an empirical
study. Economic Journal 91:907-18, 1986.
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